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IN ADMINISTERING the Bank Holding Company
Act, the Federal Reserve Board weighs the public
benefits from proposed acquisitions by bank holding
companies (hereafter called BHCs) against possible
adverse competitive effects.~BHCs are asked to dis-
cuss public benefits of proposed acquisitions in ap-
plications to acquire banks and noubanking firms. A
public benefit commonly mentioned in applications
for the acquisition of additional banks is increased
trust services to be offered to customers in the areas
of the proposed subsidiaries,2
Banks outside metropolitan areas and banks with
relatively few customers generally do not have enough
potential trust customers to justify hiring a staff to
specialize in trustservices. In some applications BHCs
indicate plans for sharing the expertise of trust de-
partment employees of their larger banks with the
proposed subsidiaries. In other cases the BFICs plan
to offer trust services directly through the trust de-
partments of their larger banks. It is contended that
under both policies the potential customers of the
banks to be acquired would have opportunities of re-
ceiving better trust services as a result of the affiliation




(c)(Z) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
as amended reads as follows The Board shall not approve
any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation un-
der this section whose effect in any section of the country
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in re-
straint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects
of the proposed transactions are clearly outweighed in the
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in
meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served.
2See orders on bank holding company cases published in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The objective of this paper is to determine whether
the amount of trust business in areas served by banks
affiliated with BHCs is significantly different from
that in areas not served by affiliated banks, Several
variables, in addition to the affiliation of banks with
BHCs, are included in regression analyses to estimate
the influence of BHCs on the trust business of banks
in areas served by their subsidiaries.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first
section discusses the measure of trust business and
the variables used to explain the level of trust busi-
ness. The second describes the sample of banks used
to estimate the influences of these variables on the
trust business of banks. The third section presents
empirical tests of hypotheses.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL OF
TRUST BUSINESS IN INDIVIDUAL
AREAS
The model specifies the factors which are presumed
to influence the demand for trust services by individ-
ual bank customers and the supply of trust services by
individual banks. The theoretical demand and supply
functions are aggregated across individuals, firms, and
banks, and a reduced form equation is specified
which indicates how the demand and supply factors
influence the level of trust services. The measure of
trust business in an area is the revenue of bank trust
departments per capita; trust revenue equals the
quantity of trust services multiplied by the price of
trust services. Measurement of the influences on the
demand for and supply of trust services is discussed
in the section where these influences are combined in
a reduced form equation. Some influences on the trust
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business of banks are mentioned, but not measured,
due to a lack of data.
Demand for Trust Services
Individuals demand trust services to secure man-
agement of their wealth. Some trust arrangements are
established by wills which give trust departments au-
thority to sell the assets of estates and distribute the
proceeds to the beneficiaries. Other trust accounts are
established as living trusts under which individuals,
while still alive, transfer legal title to part of their
wealth to trust departments to he invested and dis-
posed of as the trust agreements specify. Under an-
other type of arrangement, a trust department does
not own the assets of an individual, but acts as am
agent in managing his portfolio or giving investment
advice?
The demand for trust services by am individual is
assumed to be positively related to his wealth and,
holding wealth constant, positively related to his age.
Holding constant the influence of wealth, an individ-
ual is more likely to establish a living trust as he
gets older and considers the problems associated
with transferring am estate to his family. Also, influ-
ences like poor health may induce older people to use
trust departments as agents for investing their wealth.
The demand for trust services by an individual at
banks in the area in which he lives is assumed to be
negatively related to the price of trust services in that
area; positively related to the prices of trust services in
nearby cities and to the prices of alternatives to trust
services; and positively related to the length of time
the individual has been in the area. If this individual
has moved into the area recently, he is more likely
to have established a trust account at a hank outside
of the area than someone who has lived in the area
all of his life. The prices of trust services in nearby
cities and the prices of alternatives to trust services
are not measured in this paper and therefore are
not mentioned again as determinants of trust services.
Business firms demand trust services mainly for the
management of funds in employee benefit programs.
This source of demand at banks in an area is assumed
to be positively related to the percentage of employees
in the area that are accumulating pension benefits.
Although trust departments provide other services for
3
For more details on the operations of bank trust departments
see Edna E. Ehrlich, “The Functions and Investment Policies
of Personal Trust Departments, I and H,’ Federal Resen’e
Bank of New York Monthly Review (Oct. 1972 and January
1973).
business firms, no variables are included in the analy-
sis to explain the demand for those services.
The total demand for trust services at banks in a
particular area is assumed to he a function of the
following variables:
(a) the total wealth of people in the area and stir-
rounding areas (+);
(b) the percentage of individuals in the area and
surrounding areas that have enough wealth to
make management of their wealth by trust de-
partments profitable for trust departments and
an efficient means for individuals to invest their
wealth (+). Some of the costs to a bank of
establishing a trust account do not depend
upon the size of the estate to be managed.
Such costs include those of talking to the cus-
tomer about the purpose of the trust and dis-
tributing the profits from the investments. At
the prices trust departments would have to
charge to just cover the cost of managing small
estates, other ways of investing would be more
efficient for those individuals with relatively
small amounts of wealth. Therefore, the ef-
fective demand for trust services is assumed
to depend upon the allocation of wealth. These
two variables, (a) and (b), are independent
if the degree of inequality in the distribution
of wealth varies sufficiently among individual
areas.
(c) the average age of people in the area (4-);
(d) the price of trust services in the area (—4;
(e) recent migration into the area
inversely related to the length
uals have lived in the area.
(f) the degree to which people in surrounding
areas come into the area for reasons other than
just shopping for trust services (±)-Some of
the potential trust customers of banks in a
particular county live in surrounding counties.
There are costs to these potential customers of
coming to establish trust accounts in terms of
travel time and explicit travel costs. These costs
are smaller for people from surrounding coun-
ties who regularly come into the county for
reasons other than shopping for trust services,
such as commnting to work, entertainment, and
general shopping.
(g) the influence of BHCs (—). Some BHCs in-
struct their smaller bank subsidiaries to refer
(—4, a measure
of time individ-
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trust customers to the trust departments of the
large bank subsidiaries of the BHCs.4 If this
is the general policy of BHCs, the amount of
tmst services demanded by local customers at
local banks would tend to be lower at each
price charged by local banks for trust services.
(h) the percentage of employees in •the area that
are accumulating pension benefits (+).
Supply of Trust Services
Some of the functions performed in managing trust
assets are the same as those involved in other opera-
tions of a bank, such as buying and selling govern-
ment securities and evaluating the future profit pros-
pects of companies. If the other departments of a
bank have enough business to take advantage of some
of the economies of scale in banking, the trust depart-
ment of that bank would have a lower cost structure
than the trust department of a smaller bank.
Any influence that lowers the costs to a bank of
supplying trust services shifts its supply schedule for
trust services so that more trust services are offered
at each price. The supply of trust services by an
individual bank is assumed to he a function of the
following variables: the price of trust services (+);
the costs of inputs, such as labor (—); the volume
of transactions at the bank outside of the trust de-
partment (+); and affiliation of the bank with a BHC
(+). The sign of this last variable is positive if BHCs
help their subsidiary banks develop their own trust
departments. Several studies indicate that there
are economies of scale in bank trust departments
Suppose that a BHC helps its subsidiary banks lower
their operating costs by pooling operations. This in-
fluence on the cost structure of a subsidiary bank
would induce it to offer more trust services at each
price than it would have without affiliating with the
BHC. The costs of bank inputs are not measured and
therefore are excluded from additional analysis.
4
cerald C. Fischer, Bank Holding Companies (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 130; Steven Weiss,
‘Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy,” New England
Economic Review (January/February 1969). p. 19.
5
Frederick W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy, Costs in Commercial
Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Report No. 41
(April 1968), p. 164; Marvin S. Margolis, “Trust Depart-
ments — A Suggested Approach for Determining Func-
tional Profitability,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dalias Business
Review (April 1974), pp. 1-5; Neil B. Murphy, “Cross-
Sectional Analysis of the Cost of Operations of Trust Depart-
ments,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (February
1969), pp. 84-100; Keith V. Smith and Maurice B. Goudz-
waard, “The Profitability of Commercial Bank Trust Man-
agement,” Journal of Bank Research (Autumn 1972), pp.
166-77.
The total supply of trust services by banks in a
given area is a function of the following variables:
(a) the price of trust services in the area
(b) the size of the largest bank in the area (+),
(c) the size distribution of banks in the area. Hold-
ing constant the size of the largest bank, the
quantity of trust services supplied by banks in
an area at each price is assumed to be greater
the more equal the size distribution of banks in
this area. The influence of the size of all banks
in the area on the total supply of trust services
is captured by items (b) and (c).
(d) the existence of banks in the area that are
affiliated with BuGs (+). As explained above,
the direction of influence of this variable de-
pends upon the policies of BI-ICs. The positive
sign holds if BHCs help the trust departments
of their individual subsidiary banks attract
customers.
Reduced Form and Empirical Proxies
As indicated above, the trust business of banks in
an area is measured by the revenue of their trust de-
partments per person living in the area.6 Demand
and supply functions for trust services can be esti-
mated only with separate measures of priceand quan-
tity of services. These are not available. However, the
revenue of bank trust departments can be specified as
a function of variables listed above which influence
the supply of and demand for trust services.
Changes in variables that induce an outward shift
in the demand function cause trust revenue to rise.
The influence of shifts in the supply curve depends
upon whether the supply curve intersects the demand
curve on its elastic or inelastic portion. If the supply
curves intersect the elastic portion of the demand
curves in all areas under analysis, changes in supply
variables that cause the supply curves to shift to the
right will increase trust revenue. There is no data to
indicate whether this assumption is warranted. There-
fore, the direction of influence of supply factors on
the trust revenue of banks must he determined em-
pirically; neither positive nor negative signs are
hypothesized.
The following list indicates the measurable varia-
ables hypothesized to influence trust revenue per cap-
8Data on trust income is taken from the Report of Income by
all commercial banks that are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
Page 10FEDERAL RESERVE DANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE 1974
ita and the directions of influence. A discussion of
empirical measurement follows the identification of
each variable.
(a) Wealth per capita in the area (+). Data on
wealth are not available by county, but meas-
ures of income by county are available for pop-
ulation census years.7 Trust revenue per capita
is hypothesized to he positively •related to me-
dian family income. A ranking of counties by
median family income would approximate the
ranking by wealth per capita if no migration
takes place, if the share of income saved does
not vary among counties, and if the ranking of
counties by median family income has re-
mained the same over time.
The last assumption is relaxed by adding the
rate of change in median family income as an
explanatory variable. If two counties had the
same median income in 1969, the county with
the more rapid growth in median income from
1959 to 1969 would have a lower level of
median income in 1959 than the area with
slower growth. Accumulated nonhuman wealth
would generally be lower in the area with the
faster growth in median family income. There-
fore, trust revenue per capita is hypothesized
to he negatively related to the rate of change
in median family income, holding constant the
current level of median family income.
(b) The percentage of individuals in the area and
surrounding areas that have enough wealth to
make management of their wealth by trust de-
partments profitable for trust departments and
an efficient means for individuals to invest
their wealth (+). This variable is measured
as the percentage of families with incomes over
$50,000 in 1969. This income level is used be-
cause it is a measure of income distribution
available from the census reports which is not
highly correlated with median family income.
Two separate percentages are calculated, one
for the county under study and another for
the surrounding counties.
(c) The percentage of people in the area old
enough to consider trust accounts as a means of
managing their assets (+). This variable is
~The term wealth is used in this paper to refer to nonhuman
wealth. For maoy people the largest portion of their total
wealth is their human wealth, that is, the present value of the
future eamings they will receive from working. Individuals
have a use for trust departments only when a large portion of
their wealth is held in nonhuman fonn.
measured as the percentage of population 45
years old or older in the area under study. No
alternative measures of age were used.
(d) Migration into the area (—). This variable is
measured as the percentage of residents in a
county in 1970 who lived in another county in
1965.
(e) The degree to which people in surrounding
counties come into the county under study for
reasons other then shopping for trust services
(±).This variable is measured as the popula-
tion density of the county under study less the
population density of surrounding counties. If
people shop in an area outside the county in
which they live or commute into another area
to work, they are likely to go to a county
with a higher population density than their
home county.8
(f) The percentage of workers likely to he accumu-
lating pension benefits (+)~A uniform indus-
trial classification of employees is presented by
county in the 1970 census. Domestic and farm
workers are considered least likely to have pen-
sion plans. This variable is measured as the
percentage that domestic and farm workers
comprise of total employees and is assumed to
be negatively related to observed trust services.
(g) The size of the largest bank in the area is
measured as total deposits on December 1971.
(h) The size distribution of banks in the area. This
variable is measured by the Herfindahl Index,
computed by squaring the percentage of total
deposits held by each bank in the county as of
December 1971 and then summing over all
banks in the county. The more equa]ly deposits
are distributed among banks in a county, the
lower this index.
(i) The existence of banks in the area affiliated
with BHGS (-4-- or —). This variable is repre-
sented by dummy variables, one with a value
of unity if one or more banks in a county were
affiliated with a BHC on December 1971, zero
otherwise, and the other dummy variable with
a value of unity if one or more banks in the
county were affiliated with BHCs on Decem-
ber 1970, a value of zero othenvise. The second
8
This hypothesis about shopping behavior is implied from the
Central Place Theory. See Hugh 0. Nourse, Regional Eco-
nomics (New York: McGraw-Hill llook Co., 1968), pp.
33-62.
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iated with BHCs would improve
their trust departments under the
threat that the subsidiary banks
would start providing this service
if they did not. Negative regres-
sion coefficients would provide
support for the proposition that
BHCs have attracted the potential
trust customers of their smaller
subsidiary banks to their larger
banks. A regression coefficient not
significantly different from zero
could indicate either that the
BHCs have followed different pol-
icies in dealing with trust custom-
ers or that BHCs have had no
years, and these states appear to have
somewhat similar economic characteris-
tics.°All nonmetropolitan counties in the
three states in which at least one bank
reported trust revenue on the 1971 Re-
port of Income are included in the sam-
ple,1°As indicated in Table I, 26 of the
125 counties had banks affiliated with
BHCs as of December 1971. Two or
more banks were affiliated with BI-ICs
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dummy variable is added to allow for the pos- cember 1971. Banks were affiliated with BHCs in 22
sibility that the influence of affiliation with counties as of December 1970.
BHCs on trust services offered takes at least a
year to affect the trust revenue of subsidiary The sample is restricted to nonmetropolitan counties
banks. These variables are included sepa- because BHCs commonly list increased trust services
rately as independent variables in regression as public benefits when applying to acquire banks in
equations. those areas. Furthermore, relatively few banks in
nonmetropolitan areas offer trust services, and it is in
No hypothesis is made about the direction these areas that BHCs can be expected to have the
of influence of these dummy variables on trust greatest effect on the total supply of trust services
revenue per capita. Positive regression coeffi- offered if they have any effect at all.
cients for these variables would indicate that
BHCs have helped their smaller subsidiary The names and sizes of the BHCs represented in
banks to increase their own trust business, An the study are given in Table II. In most counties in
alternative hypothesis with the same implica- which BHCs were represented, only one bank was a
tion is that local banks other than those affil- subsidiary of a BHC. In one county in Tennessee
significant influence on the trust sen’ices offered
to potential customers of their subsidiary banks. °Some counties in Florida were originally included in the
empirical analysis but were later excluded because those
counties increased the standard error of estimate substantially.
This result is probably due to a large number of retired peo-
ple in Florida who have a higher ratio of nonhuman wealth
THE SAMPLE OF BANKS to income than people in the other three states in the study.
With data for Florida included in the sample and dummy
variables added for states, only the dummy variable for
The banks in this study are located in 125 counties Florida counties has a regression coefficient that was signifi-
in the following states: Iowa (75); Missouri (26), and cantly different from zero.
Tennessee (24). These states are in the sample be- tONoumetropolitan counties are those outside Standard Metro-
cause BHCs have acquired banks there during recent politan Statistical Areas.
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ordinary least squares regression analysis. The regres-
sion results are presented in Table III (p. 13). The
t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the re-
— C ~<0. ~ U) U~ I m
gression coefficients.
Approximately 37 percent of the variation in trust 0 . N —
revenue per capita is explained in equations that b~
•. . - 000000000000— include all of the independent vanables. There is col- I I
linearity among the independent variables, making it
difficult to determine the contribution of individual ~~
- . .- LI — Neq—CN——Oeqeq 0 0 C’
independent variables to explaining trust revenue (see a a aa 0 ci o ci ci ci ci
Table IV for an indication of the pairwise collinear- II • I
ity ) - An equation which includes only the following
three variables explains about 35 percent of the varia- ~2 ~ ~ 2 g ~
i~~O C~ ——000’- eq eq 000
tion in the dependent variable: median family income, = ci 9 dd ci ci ç ~~..
the percentage of population 45 years and older, and
the total deposits of the largest bank in the county. C, ~. — eq o , —
fl ~ N. C C’ C N ... N 0 C 0 C
Several variables were included in the equations in 6 ~ 2 2 ;
nonlinear form to see if the fit of the equations would
be improved. The fit of the equations is better with
e4 t ~ C, C, U) C.) C’ 0 eq C.) C’ eq median family income squared. Squaring the per-
centage of families with incomes over $50,000 does not ~ o 9 9 ~ 0
improve the fit of the equation substantially.
.5 0 N eq C.) C, ~ C, 0 0. cn a- ~ N Two vanables are highly correlated with the size of .~ ~ ; gg
the largest bank: (a) the population density in a 00049 0 ~C ? ~
county less than population density in surrounding
counties and (b) the percentage of workers em-
ployed as domestics and in agriculture, a proxy for ~ § ~
workers without pension plans (see Table IV). The ~c ic i d 4 ci -~ a aaci ci
estimated regression coefficients of these variables
have the hypothesized signs and are statistically sig- NNC U) N 0 fl C, U) Co C U) Co
nificant in two equations that delete the size of the ~822~ ~22
largest bank in the county as a variable (see Equa- 009 0 — ci ci ci 0 ci
tions 7 and 8), but are not statistically significant
when that variable is added to the equation. The re- .. o e. N 0 N ‘t C.) ‘t 0 — — C-) C, 0 U) — C U) 0. — eq C-)
sults in equations 7-9 illustrate that with collinearity ‘1 q Q ° ‘~ 0 a ‘a 0 C-I N
-. . 0 9 0 0 — 00000000
the t-statistics for regression coefficients vary greatly . I I I
depending upon which independent variables are in-
cluded. Under those circumstances it is difficult to ~~
- ci 0 t 000000 eq say that one variable explains trust revenue and an- z ci 0 ci — 0 ci ci ci ci ~ ci ci
other does not. I
Dummy variables that indicate the presence of ~ 2 ~
- N C, 0 0—eqeqoeqeq—N—
banks that have been acquired by BHCs have regres- < a a ci aaaa aa aa
sion coefficients which are not significantly different . . . I I I
from zero (see Equations 4 and 5). These results are
- .. . . C 0 N fl 0 N eq C-, ~ — C, ‘a C,
consistent with either of the following two inten~reta- ~~
tions: (a) some BHCs have attracted the potential ci - ci ci eS ci ci d ci ci
trust customers of their smaller subsidiary banks to be
customers of their larger subsidiaries, while other ~~ N ..‘~ N eq C’ ~ C’
- — ~. 0 0 C C,-NC,k’ C Co C, BHCs have helped their smaller subsidianes attract ‘~ c- o — N 0 0 c-I ‘a 0 -:
3 ~00000000 0000
customers for their own trust departments, and these I I
influences are of equal strength, or (b) BHCs have
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had no influence on the markets for trust services of
their smaller bank subsidiaries tbrough either channel.
The tests for the statistical significance of the regres-
sion coefficients cannot discriminate between these
two hypotheses.
Collinearity among the independent variables may
be the influence which causes the t-statistics of the
regression coefficients for the dummy variables repre-
senting BHC affiliation to be so small as to indicate
lack of statistical significance. Given that possibility, a
relevant question is: what is the economic signifi-
cance of those dummy variables for trust revenue if
the question of statistical significance is ignored? The
dependent variable is measured as dollars of trust
revenue per capita. Therefore, the regression coeffi-
cient of the dummy variable BHC 71 indicates that
trust revenue per capita was about $0.10 higher on
average in areas in which one or more banks were
subsidiaries of BHCs, holding other factors constant.
The difference was about $0.01 using the dummy
Bk-IC 70. These differences are so small as to indicate
little economic significance, especially since for the
sample of counties trust revenue per capita ranges
from $0005 to $4823.
Equations 1-3 and 6-9 in Table III were reestimated
using average trust revenue per capita in the years
1969-71 as the dependent variable. This was done to
determine whether a significant amount of random
variation could be removed by averaging over several
years. The regression results with this dependent vari-
able are not substantially different from those results
in Table III. The predictive ability of the independent
variables is not substantially higher with the depend-
ent variable, trust revenue, averaged over three years,
indicating little variation in the trust revenue of banks
over several years.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the influ-
ence of bank holding companies (BHCs) on the trust
revenue of banks in areas in which banks are affiliated
with BHCs. Remarks in other studies indicate that
BHCs could be expected to either increase or decrease
the trust activities of their smaller subsidiary banks,
depending upon the policies of the BHCs. Empirical
results of this paper indicate that the trust revenue of
banks in counties in which one or more banks are
affiliated with BHCs is neither higher nor lower than
in other counties, holding other factors constant. This
indicates either that BHCs follow different policies
concerning the trust business of their smaller banks or
that they have had no influence on the trust revenue
of banks.
This paper presents equations for estimating the
level of trust business of banks in county areas using
several variables which are assumed to influence the
demand for or supply of trust services. The trust busi-
ness of banks is measured as the revenue of bank trust
departments in each county per person living in the
county. The following variables are the most useful
for estimating the trust revenue per capita: median
family income, the percentage of population 45 years
and over, and the size of the largest bank in the area.
The results of this paper have an implication for the
regulation of BHCs. The empirical results do not indi-
cate an influence of BHCs on the trust revenues of
banks in areas with subsidiaries of BI-ICs. Therefore,
it is appropriate, to give little weight to promises by
BHCs that they will increase trust services offered to
customers of their subsidiary banks until some evi-
dence is presented to support this contention.
N
N
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